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For the past several decades, Malaysian courts have stood at the 
center of heated debates concerning freedom of religion. Conventional 
accounts trace these tensions to the rise of the dakwah (religious 
revival) movement, which has been the most dynamic social and 
political trend since the late 1970s. According to this understanding, 
legal controversies around religious freedom are the result of a clash 
between competing ideological trends—specifically, a standoff 
between an ascendant religious movement and a liberal legal order. In 
this view, conflict is understood as originating from outside the courts. 
And, framed this way, the question that naturally follows is whether 
the courts have the ability and resolve to uphold religious liberty, or if 
they will succumb to popular political pressure.1 This understanding of 
the root problem (religious revival) and what is at stake (liberty) comes 
effortlessly because it matches our taken–for–granted understandings 
of the role of law and courts in defending fundamental liberties and 
sustaining secularism. 
In general terms, courts are widely understood by scholars, 
practitioners, and the public at large as institutions that resolve conflict 
and safeguard fundamental rights such as freedom of religion.2 But this 
functional understanding precludes deeper insight into how and why 
religious liberty cases continually crop up in the Malaysian courts. I 
 
† Associate Professor and Stephen Jarislowsky Chair, Simon Fraser University, 
Canada. 
1. For an expansive argument along these lines, see generally RAN HIRSCHL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010) (discussing the interface of constitutionalism 
and increased religiosity worldwide); JOSEPH CHINYONG LIOW, PIETY AND POLITICS: 
ISLAMISM IN CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA (2009) (providing an example of this 
framing in relation to Malaysia specifically).  
2. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS  (1986) (explaining the function of courts in various political systems). 
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suggest that far from resolving conflict, the judicial system is itself a 
primary source of tension. Instead of resolving legal questions, the 
judicial system is hard-wired to produce legal controversies anew. 
Rather than simply arbitrating between contending parties, courts 
exacerbated ideological cleavages. And instead of assuaging 
uncertainties, courts in Malaysia repeatedly instill a tremendous degree 
of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety around the meaning and 
content of “religious freedom.” Ironically, law and courts—the very 
instruments charged with resolving conflict and safeguarding rights—
repeatedly deliver precisely the opposite result. 
Comparative studies from diverse contexts suggest that the 
indeterminacy of freedom of religion is not a uniquely Malaysian 
phenomenon. Although “religious freedom” and “religious liberty” 
typically elicit enthusiastic support whenever they are invoked, they 
are devilishly ambiguous concepts.3 Recent scholarship examines the 
many paradoxes that are embedded in the notion of religious freedom, 
which typically become visible only at the moment when law and legal 
institutions work to define, delimit, and give concrete meaning to the 
term on the ground.4 A first clue that we need to search for deeper 
meaning in the Malaysian context is the fact that appeals to religious 
liberty are invoked by a variety of actors, each working at cross-
purposes. Claims to religious liberty are made by religious minority 
groups (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist, and heterodox 
Muslims) vis-à-vis the Muslim majority. But so, too, do spokespersons 
for the Muslim majority deploy “rights talk” vis-à-vis religious 
minority groups. And claims to religious freedom are not only voiced 
across communal lines; they are also heard within religious 
communities, as individuals assert the right to religious liberty for their 
own persons, whereas spokespersons of religious communities 
simultaneously invoke religious liberty in their claim to defend 
collective norms from state interference.   
 
3. This is to some extent a dynamic that is inherent with a broader set of 
fundamental rights. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: 
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5–9 (1974) (describing what he 
calls a “myth of rights”). 
4. See, e.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (2005). Additionally, see the work associated with the Politics of Religion 
Freedom project, directed by Peter Danchin, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba 
Mahmood, and Winnifred Sullivan. POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CONTESTED 
NORMS AND LOCAL PRACTICES, http://politics-of-religious-freedom.berkeley.edu/ 
(last visited May 12, 2014). 
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Take, for example, the most well-known Malaysian court case, 
Lina Joy v. Religious Council of the Federal Territories,5 which lasted 
for nearly a decade and became a public spectacle at home and abroad.6 
The case concerned a woman who sought state recognition of her 
religious conversion.7 In litigating Joy’s right to religious freedom, her 
attorneys challenged the personal status laws in force in the Federal 
Territories, which provide no viable avenue for conversion out of 
Islam.8 Joy’s attorneys argued that the laws violated her right to 
religious freedom, a right enshrined in Article 11 of the Malaysian 
Constitution, which states (in part) that “Every person has the right to 
profess and practice his religion….”9 But Joy’s opponents invoked 
another clause from the same article, which states that “Every religious 
group has the right…to manage its own religious affairs….”10 This 
second set of attorneys also claimed the right to religious freedom, but 
they argued that Article 11 is meant to safeguard the ability of religious 
communities to craft their own rules and regulations (including rules 
of entry and exit), free from outside interference.11   
It is striking that protagonists on both sides of the controversy 
invoked “religious freedom” and that both sides called upon the state 
to secure these alternate visions of religious freedom. The frequency 
of such cases and the repeated appeal for state action by all parties 
suggest that these conundrums are perhaps inevitable whenever states 
attempt to adjudicate between a variety of groups and individuals, each 
of them raising the banner of religious freedom. Nonetheless, it is 
worth exploring whether particular legal arrangements exacerbate the 
 
5. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain lain, [2007] 4 
M.L.J. 585 (Malay.), aff’g Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 
2 M.L.J. 119 (Malay.).  
6. See, e.g., Cris Prystay, In Malaysia, a Test for Religious Freedom, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 25, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115645160096844802. 
7 Lina Joy, [2007] 4 M.L.J. at 592–93. 
8. See id. at 593 (stating that Joy challenged “the constitutionality of the state 
and federal legislations that forbade conversion out of Islam”).  
9. See Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 M.L.J. 
193, 198 (Malay.) (arguing that Article 11 gave her the freedom to convert to 
Christianity, which was a freedom that could not be restricted by any law). 
10. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor., [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 126 
(Malay.). 
11. See id. (finding that there would be “chaos and confusion” if plaintiff did not 
address her renunciation of Islam with the religious authority who has a right to 
manage its own affairs under Article 11(3) prior to her conversion).  
2014] THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MALAYSIA     471 
frequency and intensity of these sorts of legal dilemmas. In the case of 
Malaysia, two factors are particularly crucial. The first is that Malaysia 
regulates religion far more than most other countries. By one measure, 
Malaysia ranks sixth out of 175 countries worldwide in the degree of 
state regulation of religion.12 As a result, one’s official religious status 
is not a trivial matter—it has legal implications for who one can marry, 
whether or not (and how) one may worship, and myriad other rules and 
regulations. As I show in the analysis that follows, such extensive 
regulation tends to generate its own tensions, legal and otherwise. A 
second institutional factor that exacerbates these legal dilemmas is the 
bifurcation of the Malaysian judicial system into “civil” and “shariah” 
tracks. In theory, these two jurisdictions operate independent of one 
another, with the civil courts adjudicating family disputes among non-
Muslims and “shariah” courts handling family law disputes for 
Muslims. In practice, however, there are cases in which the two 
jurisdictions collide.   
The case of Shamala v. Jayaganesh13 underlines this problem. 
Shamala and Jayaganesh were married with children when Jayaganesh 
converted to Islam and initiated divorce from his wife.14 Because 
husband and wife fell under the jurisdiction of different courts 
following Jayanganesh’s conversion, they each secured custody orders 
from alternate jurisdictions.15 Shamala’s custody order came from the 
civil courts because she fell under civil court jurisdiction, whereas 
Jayanganesh secured his custody order from the shariah courts.16 The 
two court orders came to different conclusions about the custody of the 
children and neither parent was able to contest the competing court 
order as the result of legal standing requirements in the civil and 
shariah courts. As with Lina Joy, Shamala produced a political crisis 
and became a focal point for competing politicians and civil society 
groups, each rallying around the banner of “religious liberty.” 
 
12. This is the ranking for 2002 according to the cross-national Government 
Involvement in Religion measure developed by Jonathan Fox. JONATHAN FOX, A 
WORLD SURVEY OF RELIGION AND THE STATE 184 (2008). It should be noted that 
Fox’s study may underestimate the level of regulation in Malaysia, as several 
indicators appear to be miscoded, including the appointment and funding of clergy, 
forced observance, religious education, religious basis of personal status laws and 
restrictions on the publication of religious materials, among others. 
13. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648 
(Malay.). 
14. Id. at 648.  
15. Id. at 653. 
16. Id.  
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In the analysis that follows, I examine Lina Joy and Shamala to 
show that the politics of religious freedom in Malaysia has little to do 
with “religion” and far more to do with the inherent ambiguities of 
religious liberty, coupled with specific institutional features of the 
Malaysian judiciary. Through an examination of the juridification of 
religious law and the institutional development of the Malaysian 
judiciary, I show that the root causes of these controversies are not of 
recent vintage, but rather were set in motion under British colonial rule 
more than a century ago. 
I. A LEGACY OF COLONIALISM: “RACE” AND “RELIGION” AS 
CATEGORIES OF GOVERNANCE 
Malaysia is famously known for its vibrant multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious communities. The ethnic-Malay community is 
overwhelmingly Muslim and constitutes just over half of Malaysia’s 
total population of 30 million.17 The second largest ethnic community 
is Chinese, which stands at approximately 25% of the total 
population.18 Most ethnic-Chinese identify as Buddhist (76%), with 
substantial numbers identifying as Taoist (11%) and Christian (10%).19 
The third largest ethnic group is Indian and stands at approximately 
8% of the total population.20 This community is also religiously 
diverse, with most Indian Malaysians following Hinduism (85%) and 
smaller numbers practicing Christianity (7.7%) and Islam (3.8%).21 
The overall breakdown of the population according to religion is 
approximately 60% Muslim, 19% Buddhist, 9% Christian, 6% Hindu, 
and 5% of other faiths. 22   
 
17. See POPULATION PROJECTION, MALAYSIA 2010–2040: SUMMARY FINDINGS, 
DEP’T STATISTICS MALAY. 1, 3, available at http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/im 
ages/stories/files/LatestReleases/population/Ringkasan_Penemuan-Sum 
mary_Findings_2010-2040.pdf (last updated Jan. 18, 2013). The ethnic-Malay 
community is legally (indeed constitutionally) defined as Muslim.  MALAY. FED. 
CONST., Nov. 1, 2010, art. 160(2). According to Malaysian state law and official 
census figures, every ethnic-Malay, to a person, is Muslim.  
18. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC 
REPORT 2010, DEP’T STATISTICS MALAY. 5 (2011), available at http://www.statisti 
cs.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_
dan_Ciri-ciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf. 
19. Id. at 82–98. 
20. Id. at 5.  
21. Id. at 82–98. 
22. Id. at 9. 
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This multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition is largely the 
result of British commercial and colonial domination that began in the 
nineteenth century.23 Laborers were brought from China by the 
hundreds of thousands to work in the tin industry and the British turned 
to India for cheap labor to run vast rubber plantations.24 Colonial 
policy tended to overlook the tremendous ethnic and linguistic 
diversity internal to these groupings and economic roles were assigned 
according to “race.”25   
The term “race” may raise eyebrows among some readers. It is 
used here for analytical rather than normative purposes to mark a 
distinct shift in the way that difference was encoded in state law 
beginning in the colonial period as a means to justify the social and 
economic hierarchies that were part and parcel of the colonial project. 
Laura Gomez explains the analytical utility of the term “race” with her 
observation that “both race and ethnicity are about socially constructed 
group difference in society [but] race is always about hierarchical 
social difference….”26 The term “race” thus captures a power 
dimension that tends to fall out of the picture in discussions of 
“ethnicity.” In using the term, it is important to be clear that I subscribe 
to the three components of the constructionist view of race outlined by 
Gomez: (1) a biological basis for race is rejected; (2) race is viewed as 
a social construct that changes along with political, economic, and 
other context; and, (3) “although race is socially constructed… [it] has 
real consequences.”27 
 
23. Parts of the Malay Peninsula were multiethnic when British commercial 
interests first arrived on the scene, but economic forces accelerated the rate of 
demographic change.  
24. While most accounts of migration to the Malay Peninsula focus on the influx 
of Chinese and Indian workers, there was also significant Malay migration through 
this period. By 1931, nearly half of Malays in the former protectorates “were either 
first generation arrivals from the Netherlands East Indies or descendants of 
Indonesian migrants who had arrived after 1891.” BARBARA ANDAYA & LEONARD 
ANDAYA, A HISTORY OF MALAYSIA 184 (2001). And just as Chinese and Indian 
migrants were a mix of various ethnic and linguistic groups, the “Malay” community 
was similarly diverse.  
25. Particularly revealing is how census categories merged over time, both 
during the colonial era and after, reflecting (and reinforcing) new political and social 
categories. See Charles Hirschman, The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: 
Political Economy and Racial Ideology, 1 SOC. F. 330 (1986).  
26. Laura E. Gómez, Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: 
An Invitation to Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN. R. L. & SOC. SCI. 487, 490 
(2010). 
27. Id. at 491. 
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As in other times and places, the legal construction of “race” 
tended to serve economic and political objectives. For example, the 
Malay Reservations Act set land aside for ethnic-Malays to use in 
“traditional” agricultural pursuits, first among them rice cultivation. 
Although the Act was made in the name of preserving “the Malay way 
of life,” its underlying objective was to limit the expansion of ethnic-
Chinese business interests, to bar ethnic-Malays from competing in the 
lucrative rubber industry, and to preserve adequate food supplies in the 
colony. The official and unofficial basis for the legal definition of 
“Malay” was thus context-specific, but the legal category acquired 
increasing political salience as Malays were granted exclusive access 
to positions in the civil service, special business permits, government 
scholarships, and lucrative government contracts under the late 
colonial administration. The Malay Reservations Act defined a Malay 
as “any person belonging to the ‘Malayan race’ who habitually spoke 
Malay … and who professed Islam.”28 The racial category of 
“Malayan” or “Malay” was therefore legally fused with the religious 
designation, “Muslim.” The fused racial/religious category, first borne 
in the colonial era, remains virtually unchanged until the present day, 
as enshrined in Article 160(2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution.29 
Religious categories are thus defined and regulated by state law and 
thoroughly intertwined with the politics of race and access to state 
resources. 
Often in tacit cooperation or coordination with indigenous elites, 
the British developed personal status laws for the various ethnic and 
religious communities under its control. “Anglo-Hindu law” was 
developed and applied to Hindu subjects; “Chinese customary law” 
was developed and applied to Chinese subjects; and “Anglo-Muslim 
law” was developed and applied to Muslim subjects in matters of 
family law.30 While these legal regimes had some basis in local 
religious and customary norms, codification and application by a 
centralized state was a significant departure from local practice. To 
underline this point and provide essential context for the cases 
 
28. ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 24, at 183. 
29. Article 160 (2) defines "Malay" as “a person who professes the religion of 
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to Malay custom.” 
MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 160 (2). 
30. See generally M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975) (discussing Anglo–Hindu law, 
Chinese customary law, and Anglo–Muslim law in British Malaysia and elsewhere). 
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examined later in this study, it is worth exploring the development of 
“Anglo-Muslim law” in British Malaya in further detail.   
First, it is important to note that to the extent that the Islamic legal 
tradition was practiced in the pre-colonial Malay Peninsula, it was 
socially embedded and marked by tremendous variability across time 
and place.31 Religious leaders were not part of a centralized state 
apparatus.32 Instead, they were “members of village communities who, 
for reasons of exceptional piety or other ability, had been chosen by 
the community to act as imam of the local mosque….”33 As in other 
Muslim-majority areas, the colonial period marked a key turning point 
for the institutionalization and centralization of religious authority.34 
The British first issued a “Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance” to 
regulate Muslim family law in the Straits Settlements in 1880.35 And 
with British assistance and encouragement, similar Muhammadan 
marriage and divorce enactments went into force in Perak (1885), 
Kedah (1913), Kelantan (1915), and most other states of British 
Malaya. “Anglo-Muslim law” incorporated select fragments of fiqh 
(classical Islamic jurisprudence), but carried epistemological 
assumptions and organizing principles that were based on English 
common law and entirely distinct from usul al-fiqh, the legal method 
undergirding classical Islamic jurisprudence.36 As M.B. Hooker 
 
31. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur’an and the Common Law: 
Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 236–
37 (1994).  
32. See WILLIAM R. ROFF, THE ORIGINS OF MALAY NATIONALISM 67 (1967) (“In 
the realm of religious belief, as in that of political organization, the Malay state as a 
rule lacked the resources necessary for centralization of authority.”). 
33. Id.  
34. Key studies of this transformation include ROFF, supra note 32; Horowitz, 
supra note 31; M.B. HOOKER, supra note 30. 
35. The British first gained control of port cities for the purpose of trade and 
commerce in Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824). Together, the 
three outposts formed the Straits Settlements, which were later ruled directly as a 
formal Crown colony beginning in 1867. Separately, Britain established 
protectorates in what would come to be known as the Federated Malay States of 
Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, and Selangor, and the Unfederated Malay States of 
Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu. By the early twentieth century, all 
of the territory of the Malay Peninsula was brought under similar agreements as 
Britain sought to extend its control and local rulers sought accommodation as a 
means to consolidate their own power vis-à-vis local competitors. 
36. See WAEL HALLAQ, SHARIA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 
(2009) (providing a comprehensive study of usul al-fiqh and its subversion by 
modern state law); Tamir Moustafa, Judging in God’s Name: State Power, 
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explains, “the classical syarî’ah is not the operative law and has not 
been since the colonial period.  ‘Islamic law’ is really Anglo-Muslim 
law; that is, the law that the state makes applicable to Muslims.”37 The 
Islamic legal tradition was thus “secularized” in the sense that it was 
formalized, codified, and institutionalized as an instrument of the 
modern state. By the beginning of the twentieth century, “a classically-
trained Islamic jurist would be at a complete loss with this Anglo-
Muslim law” whereas “a common lawyer with no knowledge of Islam 
would be perfectly comfortable.”38   
Separate courts for Muslim subjects were established as a 
subordinate part of the judicial system with jurisdiction limited to 
family law matters and rulings subject to appeal before the High 
Courts, which functioned according to English common law. As in its 
other colonial holdings, the British thus shaped the emergence of a 
bifurcated legal system. This bifurcation of the judicial system 
continued after independence in 1957. The federal civil courts 
continued to administer commercial, criminal, and administrative law, 
and personal status law for non-Muslims. State-level Muslim Courts 
(rebranded “Shariah Courts” in 1976) exercised jurisdiction over 
Muslims in the area of personal status law and certain defined aspects 
of criminal law. Shariah court rulings were subject to review by the 
federal civil courts, but the civil courts exercised this jurisdiction only 
on occasion. Nonetheless, the government amended the Federal 
Constitution in 1988 to bar the federal civil courts from overturning 
state level shariah court rulings. Article 121(1A) declared that the High 
Courts of the Federation “shall have no jurisdiction in any respect of 
any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts.”39 In theory, 
Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution demarcated a clean 
division between the civil courts and the shariah courts. Muslims 
would henceforth be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the 
shariah courts in matters related to religion while non-Muslims would 
 
Secularism, and the Politics of Islamic Law in Malaysia, 3 OXFORD J.  L. AND 
RELIGION 152 (2014) (examining these developments in contemporary Malaysia). 
37. M.B. Hooker, Introduction: Islamic Law in South–East Asia, 4 AUSTL. J. 
ASIAN L. 213, 218 (2002). 
38. Id. 
39. MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 121 (1A). 
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remain subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts.40 In practice, 
however, dozens of cases presented vexing legal questions.   
II. LINA JOY V. RELIGIOUS COUNCIL OF THE FEDERAL TERRITORIES 
Perhaps the most controversial Malaysian court case of all time 
concerned a Malay woman who sought state recognition of her 
conversion to Christianity so that she could marry a non-Muslim. The 
reader will recall that different personal status laws had been 
developed for various ethnic and religious communities in British 
Malaya. The separate family law regimes for non-Muslim 
communities were repealed and folded into a single Marriage and 
Reform Act in 1976, leaving Muslim family law as the only distinct 
body of family law, institutionally entrenched in state-level Muslim 
courts. These separate jurisdictions for Muslim and non-Muslim 
family law left no official route for marriage between Muslims and 
non-Muslims.41 The only route to marriage was for the non-Muslim 
partner to convert to Islam or for the Muslim partner to change his or 
her legal name. A name change served as a way for star-crossed lovers 
to circumvent the letter of the law because a person’s religion was 
simply assumed by the legally registered name. 
In 1997, the woman who would eventually come to be known as 
Lina Joy applied to change her name from Azlina bte Jailani (a Muslim 
name) to Lina Lelani (a non-Muslim name) so that she could enter into 
marriage with her non-Muslim partner.42 However, the administrative 
unit charged with processing such requests, the National Registration 
Department (NRD), rejected her application.43 Azlina filed a second 
application, this time to change the name on her National Identity Card 
to “Lina Joy.”44 The National Registration Department approved the 
second request, but Joy’s replacement identity card now recorded her 
 
40. Schedule Nine of the Federal Constitution sets out the areas of law that fall 
within the jurisdiction of state-level shariah courts. Id.  
41. It should be observed that these legal restrictions do not conform to classical 
Islamic jurisprudence, which holds that marriage between a Muslim man and a non-
Muslim woman (Christian or Jewish) is permissible. It is the bifurcated structure of 
the legal system rather than religious prohibition that is the source of tension.  
42. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, [2007] 
4 M.L.J. 585, 592 (Malay.). 
43. Id. (providing no reason for the rejection of her application). 
44. Id. She explained in both applications that she had converted to Christianity 
and that she intended to marry a Christian man. Id. at 593. It is likely that this 
statement raised alarms among those in the NRD.  
478 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:468 
 
 
official religion as “Islam.”45 The statement of official religion was the 
result of a new administrative procedure designed to close the loophole 
that had enabled Muslims to effectively sidestep the state’s regulation 
of religion by way of a name change.46 Lina Joy filed a third 
application, this time to remove the word “Islam” from her identity 
card, but the NRD refused to accept her application without 
certification from a shariah court that she was no longer a Muslim.47    
Joy chose not to pursue this avenue because it had been an 
administrative dead-end for others before her.48 Instead, Joy initiated a 
lawsuit against the National Registration Department and the Religious 
Council of the Federal Territories.49 Joy’s attorney, Benjamin Dawson, 
pointed to Article 11(1) of the Malaysian Constitution, which states, 
“Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion….” 
Dawson argued that Article 11 gave Joy alone the freedom to declare 
her religion and that she had no obligation to seek certification from a 
third party.50 The counsel for the government argued that the court 
should dismiss the petition because conversion out of Islam was a legal 
matter that lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the shariah courts as 
opposed to the civil courts. They argued that Article 121(1A) clearly 
provided that the civil courts “shall have no jurisdiction in any respect 
of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts.”51 
 
45. Id. at 593.  
46. P.U. (A) 70/2000 came into force retroactively on Oct. 1, 1999. Id. Although 
it is impossible to know with certainty, the timing of the rule change and their 
retroactive effect suggests that these regulations were issued as a direct result of Lina 
Joy’s application, and that the new regulations were intended to close the loophole 
that had enabled conversion by way of name change.  
47. Id.  
48. See, e.g., Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) 
Kedah & Anor [1994] 1 M.L.J. 690, 693–94 (Malay.) (holding that plaintiff was still 
a Muslim until a declaration was made by a shariah court that he was not); Md Hakim 
Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur, [1998] 1 M.L.J. 
681 (Malay.). 
49. Lina Joy, [2007] 4 M.L.J. at 593.  
50. Joy’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of Article 2 of the 
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act of 1993 and related state 
enactments.  They also claimed that the Shariah Criminal Offences Act of 1997 and 
related State Enactments were not applicable to the plaintiff who was now a 
Christian. Id.  
51. MALAY. FED. CONST. art. 121(1A). 
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Relying on court precedent, Judge Faiza Tamby Chik agreed that 
the matter lay within the jurisdiction of the shariah courts.52 
Furthermore, he addressed the constitutional provisions on freedom of 
religion, explaining that Joy’s fundamental freedoms were not violated 
if one understands that the true intent of Article 11 is to protect the 
freedom of religious communities rather than for individuals to profess 
and practice the religion of their choice.53 To support this 
interpretation, Judge Tamby Chik pointed to other clauses in Article 
11 of the Federal Constitution, including clause 3, which states: “Every 
religious group has the right…to manage its own religious affairs….”54 
The true meaning of freedom of religion, the judge explained, is that 
religious authorities should be left to regulate their own internal 
matters without outside interference.55  Judge Tamby Chik explained 
in his ruling that: 
 When a Muslim wishes to renounce/leave the 
religion of Islam, his other rights and obligations as a 
Muslim will also be jeopardized and this is an affair of 
Muslim [sic] falling under the first defendant’s 
jurisdiction…. Even though the first part [of article 11] 
provides that every person has the right to profess and 
practice his religion, this does not mean that the 
plaintiff can hide behind this provision without first 
settling the issue of renunciation of her religion (Islam) 
with the religious authority which has the right to 
 
52. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 129. 
(Malay.) (“Her purported renunciation of Islam can only be determined by the 
Shariah Courts and not the Civil Courts pursuant to art. 121(1A).”).  
53. See id. at 133 (stating that Article 11 was “created for the harmony and well-
being of the multi-racial and multi-religious communities of this country”). This 
decision departed from earlier rulings by the civil courts in Ng Wan Chan v. Islamic 
Religious Council of the Federal Territories, [1991] 3 M.L.J. 487 (Malay.) and Dalip 
Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam, [1992] 1 M.L.J. 
1 (Malay.). In both cases, the civil courts took the position that only issues expressly 
conferred to the jurisdiction of the shariah courts would remain in their jurisdiction. 
Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 133. This principle changed just prior to Lina Joy in a 
decision involving a Sikh man (Soon Singh) who wished to change his religious 
designation after having converted to Islam as a teenager. Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan 
Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah, [1994] 1 M.L.J. 690 (Malay.). In this 
case, the civil courts adopted a new doctrine of implied jurisdiction vis-à-vis the 
shariah courts, effectively providing the shariah courts with exclusive jurisdiction 
over such matters. Id. at 693.  
54. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 126 (citing MALAY. FED. CONST. art. 11(3)(a)).  
55. Id. at 126.   
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manage its own religious affairs under art 11 (3) (a) of 
the FC.56 
What is most striking for our purpose is the fact that “freedom of 
religion” was invoked by advocates on both sides of this legal struggle. 
Joy and her supporters insisted on her right to individual religious 
freedom while her opponents insisted on religious liberty of another 
sort: freedom of the Muslim community to maintain its own norms 
(including rules of entry and exit) without state interference. 
Having lost the battle in the High Court, Joy’s attorneys changed 
their strategy and focused on the narrow administrative question of 
whether the Director General of the National Registration Department 
had overstepped his bounds by requiring certification from a Shariah 
Court.57 It did not go unnoticed that the 2-1 split decision mirrored the 
emerging religious divide in Malaysian society. Two Muslim justices, 
Abdul Aziz Mohamad and Arifin Zakaria, wrote the majority opinion 
while Gopal Sri Ram, a non-Muslim, wrote the dissenting opinion.58 
Judges Abdul Aziz Mohamad and Arifin Zakaria took the position that 
whether or not a person had renounced Islam is “a question of Islamic 
law that was not within the jurisdiction of the NRD and that the NRD 
was not equipped or qualified to decide.”59 The dissenting judgment 
from Judge Gopal Sri Ram took the position that “an order or 
certificate from the Syariah Court was not a relevant document for the 
processing of the appellant’s application. It was not a document 
prescribed by the 1990 Regulations.”60 Judge Sri Ram concluded that, 
“[w]here a public decision-maker takes extraneous matters into 
account, his or her decision is null and void and of no effect.”61   
Having lost in the Court of Appeal, Joy and her attorneys had one 
final opportunity in the highest appellate court, the Federal Court of 
Malaysia. Watching briefs were held by NGOs on both sides of the 
case. The Bar Council, the National Human Rights Society (HAKAM), 
and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, 
Hinduism, and Sikhism held watching briefs on behalf of Lina Joy, 
 
56. Id. at 125. 
57. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, [2005] 6 M.L.J. 193, 
199 (Malay.).  
58. Id. at 198, 214. 
59. Id. at 208–09. 
60. Id. at 219 (Gopal Sri Ram, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. at 220. 
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while conservative Muslim organizations submitted watching briefs of 
their own.62  In a 2-1 split decision, the 53-page ruling reproduced the 
same fault lines that were present in the Court of Appeal.63 Chief 
Justice Ahmad Fairuz and Justice Alauddin presented a technical 
rationale for the NRD’s actions.64 The dissenting judgment from 
Richard Malanjum, on the other hand, pointed once again to the glaring 
lacuna in the law: “The insistence by NRD for a certificate of apostasy 
from the Federal Territory Syariah Court or any Islamic Authority was 
not only illegal but unreasonable. This was because under the 
applicable law, the Syariah Court in the Federal Territory has no 
statutory power to adjudicate on the issue of apostasy.”65 In other 
words, there was a lacuna in the law. Judge Malanjum explained that, 
regardless of this lacuna in the law, in such a situation the federal 
courts have a constitutional duty to protect fundamental rights, 
regardless of Article 121(1A):  
 Since constitutional issues are involved especially 
on the question of fundamental rights as enshrined in 
the Constitution, it is of critical importance that the civil 
superior courts should not decline jurisdiction by 
merely citing art 121 (1A).  The article only protects the 
Shariah Court in matters within their jurisdiction, 
which does not include interpretation of the provisions 
of the Constitution.  Hence, when jurisdictional issues 
arise civil courts are not required to abdicate their 
constitutional function.  Legislation criminalizing 
apostasy or limiting the scope of fundamental 
liberties…are constitutional issues in nature which only 
the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine.66 
By failing to address these issues head on, the majority decision 
in Lina Joy did little to address the underlying legal conundrums that 
lay at the heart of all prior conversion cases. Lina Joy was a painful 
reminder that the Malaysian judicial system was hard-wired to produce 
these sorts of legal tensions.   
 
62. See Tamir Moustafa, Liberal Rights Versus Islamic Law? The Construction 
of a Binary in Malaysian Politics, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 776–77, 783 (2013). 
63. Lina Joy lwn v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, 
[2007] 4 M.L.J. 585, 594, 596 (Malay.). 
64. See id. at 594–96. 
65. Id. at 598 (Malanjum, C.J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 597–98. 
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The case followed a similar fact pattern to many other conversion 
cases that preceded it, but carried one unique aspect: Joy was an ethnic 
Malay, whereas all prior conversion cases concerned non-Malays who 
had converted to Islam and subsequently sought to change their 
religious status back to their original faith. Lina Joy’s case thus 
exposed a racial dimension in the equation. As part of its ruling, the 
court relied on Article 160 of the Federal Constitution, which defines 
Malay as “a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually 
speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to Malay custom….”67 
Citing Article 160, the Court explained that Lina Joy’s “race” carried 
legal consequences that could not be abandoned:   
In her affidavit affirmed on 8 May 2000, the 
plaintiff stated that her father is a Malay.  His name is 
Jailani bin Shariff.  All his life, the father has been 
professing and practising the Islamic religion.  So is the 
mother.  Her name is Kalthum bte Omar, a Malay.  Both 
of the parents are still professing and practising the 
Islamic religion.  And being Malays they habitually 
speaks the Malay language and conform to Malay 
custom.  The plaintiff also stated that she is raised, and 
grew up in a household of Islamic belief although her 
belief in Islam is shallow.  In exh C, she stated that her 
original name is Azlina bte Jailani as is stated in her I/C 
No 7220456.  I therefore conclude that the plaintiff is a 
Malay.  By art 160 of the FC, the plaintiff is a Malay 
and therefore as long as she is a Malay by that definition 
she cannot renounce her Islamic religion at all.  As a 
Malay, the plaintiff remains in the Islamic faith until 
her dying days [emphasis added].68 
The ruling was a clear exposition of the conflation of Malay racial 
and religious identity, both in the legal system and in the social 
imaginary of contemporary Malaysia, which, as we have seen, goes all 
the way back to the origins of the modern Malaysian state under British 
rule. Lina Joy suggests that the state’s extensive regulation of religion 
and race gave rise to festering legal conundrums.   
 
67. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 132 
(Malay.); MALAY. FED. CONST., art. 160.  
68. Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 144.  
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Lina Joy is widely understood as a freedom of religion case. In 
one sense, this is absolutely accurate. Joy was fighting for state 
recognition of her conversion. The case was understood as a freedom 
of religion case by many in the Muslim community, too, although this 
camp viewed the case as a test of shariah court autonomy vis-à-vis the 
civil courts in multi-religious Malaysia. Yet the source of repeated 
institutional friction was not merely the result of individual versus 
collectivist visions of “freedom of religion.” The cases were rooted in 
the institutional features of Malaysian judiciary. To gain further 
traction, it is worthwhile examining another landmark case that 
exposes the same institutional source of legal friction. 
III.  SHAMALA V. JAYAGANESH 
Shamala v. Jayaganesh69 is another case that commanded nation-
wide attention. Shamala Sathiyaseelan and Jeyaganesh Mogarajah, 
both Hindus, were married in 1998 under the Marriage and Divorce 
Act, which governs family law for non-Muslims in Malaysia.70 They 
had two children, who were considered Hindu as a result of their 
parents’ religious status.71 Four years into their marriage, Jeyanganesh 
converted to Islam.72 Six days after his conversion, he registered their 
two children, ages two and three, as new converts to Islam without his 
wife’s knowledge or consent.73 When Shamala learned of the 
development, she took the children to her parents’ home and filed a 
petition to secure their custody.74 Shamala obtained an interim custody 
order from the civil courts, the appropriate legal body for adjudicating 
family law disputes among non-Muslims.75 But shortly thereafter, her 
husband secured an interim custody order of his own from a shariah 
court on the grounds that he and the children were now legally Muslim 
and therefore under the jurisdiction of the shariah courts in matters of 
family law.76 The two custody orders thus came to opposite 
conclusions over who had the right to take possession of the children, 
yet neither husband nor wife was able to contest the competing court 
order as the result of legal standing requirements.   
 
69. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648 
(Malay.). 
70. Id. at 653.  
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
484 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:468 
 
 
Shamala begged the question of which court had the ultimate 
authority to determine the religious status and the custody of the 
children. According to the law, the shariah courts have jurisdiction 
over personal status questions involving individuals who are legally 
registered as Muslim.77 Moreover, Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution prevents the civil courts from reviewing shariah court 
decisions.78 Yet it was undeniable that Shamala’s rights were harmed. 
Married to a Hindu according to civil law, she now found herself in a 
custody battle that involved the shariah courts. As with the Lina Joy, 
Shamala produced a political crisis and became a focal point for 
competing politicians and civil society groups, each rallying around 
the banner of “religious liberty.” The case provided the spark that 
ignited a full throttled campaign between liberal and conservative 
activists. 
Shamala’s attorney, Ravi Nekoo, made a concerted effort to 
attract public attention—an effort that was facilitated by the rapidly 
changing environment of civil society activism and digital media. 
Nekoo was an active member in the legal aid community, and he was 
well networked with a variety of rights organizations in Kuala Lumpur. 
Nekoo turned to the most prominent women’s rights groups in Kuala 
Lumpur: the Women’s Aid Organization, the All Women Action 
Movement, the Women’s Centre for Change, Sisters in Islam, and the 
Women Lawyers’ Association.79 He also turned to religious 
organizations, most notably the Hindu Sangam, the Catholic Lawyers 
Society, and the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST).80 These 
 
77. Id. at 660.  
78. Id. at 658. This is the standing interpretation provided by the Federal Court 
through case law.  In contrast, prominent liberal rights attorneys Malik Imtiaz and 
Shanmuga Kanesalingam maintain that, if properly read, Article 121(1A) should not 
preclude the civil courts from reviewing shariah court rulings when fundamental 
liberties are in jeopardy. They argue that the weakening of formal judicial 
independence made judges vulnerable to political pressures, particularly when they 
are working on politically sensitive cases. According to this view, the weak stance 
of the civil courts in cases involving Article 121(1A) is ultimately the result of 
political pressure and insufficient judicial independence rather than express 
constitutional provisions. Interview with Shanmuga Kanesalingam, in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malay. (July 9, 2009); Interview with Malik Imtiaz, in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malay. (Nov. 5, 2009). 
79. Telephone interview with Ravi Nekoo (Feb. 18, 2012).  
80. Id.  
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groups took an immediate interest in the case and they quickly gained 
formal observer status with the High Court.81 Subsequently, they filed 
amicus curiae briefs and mobilized their resources to bring public 
attention to the case.82   
In the High Court proceedings that ensued, Shamala sought a 
court order declaring the conversions of the children null and void.83 
She claimed the equal right to decide the religion of the children and 
objected to the unilateral conversions. However, Judge Faiza Tamby 
Chik (the same judge who had issued the High Court ruling in Lina 
Joy) ruled that Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides that “the 
religion of a person under the age of 18 shall be decided by his parent 
or guardian.”84 Judge Faiza explained that the use of the singular—
“parent”—should be taken to mean that unilateral conversion of a 
minor, without the consent or even knowledge of the other parent, was 
legal.85  
Finding that the conversion of the children conformed to the law, 
Judge Faiza moved onto the question of whether Shamala could further 
challenge the new religious status of the children through the civil 
courts. Here, Judge Faiza relied upon Article 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution to argue that the civil courts did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the matter: 
I have come to the conclusion that by virtue of art. 
121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Shariah Court 
is the qualified forum to determine the status of the two 
minors.  Only the Shariah Court has the legal expertise 
in hukum syarak [shariah law] to determine whether the 
 
81. Id. Malik Imtiaz also held a watching brief for the Malaysian Bar Council. 
82. Id.  
83. Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 648, 
652 (Malay.). 
84. Id. at 649. Judge Faiza, who had served as a language instructor before he 
began his legal career, devoted several pages of his ruling to explain the grammar 
and meaning of words in the singular and plural. According to Judge Faiza, we must 
accept the plain meaning of the word “parent” in Article 12(4) of the Federal 
Constitution. The article “uses the word ‘parent.’ It is spelt ‘p-a-r-e-n-t’ without the 
[letter] ‘s.’ It is used in the singular sense.” Id. at 655. 
85. Id. at 656. Other cases concerning the unilateral conversion of minors 
include Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi, Pasir Mas, Kelantan, [1990] 2 M.L.J. 300 (Malay.); 
Subashini Rajasingam v. Saravanan Thangathoray, [2007] 4 M.L.J. 97 (Malay.); 
Indira Gandhi v. Muhammad Riduan bin Abdullah, [2013] High Court of Malay. in 
Ipoh, available at http://www.loyarburok.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
07/Indira-Gandhi-Lee-Swee-Seng-Judgment.pdf. 
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conversion of the two minors is valid or not.  Only the 
Shariah Court has the competency and expertise to 
determine the said issue.86 
The ruling put Shamala in a no-win situation. She had no remedy 
in the civil courts nor did she have legal standing in the shariah courts 
because she was not a Muslim. Even if she had wished to approach the 
shariah courts for relief, it was not an avenue open to her. Judge Faiza 
acknowledged the unsatisfactory result:  “What then is for her to do? 
The answer [is that] it is not for this court to legislate and confer 
jurisdiction to the Civil Court but for Parliament to provide the 
remedy.”87 Fearing that her husband would deny her joint custody, 
Shamala moved to Australia with the children, never to return.88    
IV. TWO VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  
As a direct result of the Shamala ruling in April 2004, liberal 
rights groups formed a coalition named “Article 11” after the article of 
the Federal Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion. The 
coalition included such prominent organizations as the All Women’s 
Action Society (AWAM), the Bar Council of Malaysia, the National 
Human Rights Society (HAKAM), the Malaysian Civil Liberties 
Society, Sisters in Islam, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), and the 
Women's Aid Organisation (WAO). The Article 11 Coalition also 
included the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), an 
umbrella organization representing the concerns of non-Muslim 
communities in Malaysia. The objective of the Article 11 coalition was 
to focus public attention on the erosion of individual rights and to 
“ensure that Malaysia does not become a theocratic state.”89 The 
Article 11 coalition produced a website, short documentary videos 
providing firsthand interviews with non-Muslims who were adversely 
affected by Article 121(1A), analysis and commentary from their 
attorneys, and recorded roundtables on the threat posed by Islamic 
 
86. Shamala Sathiyaseelan, [2004] 2 M.L.J. at 660.  
87. Id. at 659.  
88. Shamala attempted to appeal the ruling, but the Federal Court dismissed the 
appeal without considering the constitutional questions on the grounds that she was 
in contempt of court for denying Jeyaganesh his visitation rights. 
89. ARTICLE 11 COALITION, http://www.article11.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2010).  The website has since been closed. 
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law.90 The Article 11 coalition and the Malaysian Bar Council went on 
to organize a series of public forums across Malaysia. The road show 
campaign was coupled with a petition to the Prime Minister, signed by 
20,000 concerned Malaysians, calling on the government to affirm 
“Malaysia shall not become a theocratic state.”91 
It is not difficult to understand why the rulings roused deep 
concern for some. Each case provided a clear example that the civil 
courts were beginning to cede broad legal authority when issues 
around Islam were involved, even when it meant trampling on 
individual rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution and even when 
non-Muslims were involved. Within the broad context of the dakwah 
movement over the preceding three decades, liberal rights activists 
understood the rulings as the failure of this last bastion of secular law.   
However, these cases evoked the worst fears among conservatives 
as well. For conservatives, the cases were understood as an attack on 
the autonomy of the shariah courts. In the Lina Joy case, for example, 
the central focus of conservative discourse concerned the implications 
of an adverse ruling on the Muslim community’s ability to manage its 
own religious affairs in multi-religious Malaysia. If the civil courts 
affirmed Joy’s individual right to freedom of religion, it would 
essentially constitute a breakdown in the autonomy of the shariah 
courts and a breach in the barrier that conservatives understood Article 
121(1A) to guarantee.  
Conservative activists argued that human rights instruments are 
focused exclusively on the individual and, as such, they are unable to 
accommodate communal understandings of rights when they come in 
tension with individual rights claims.92 Prominent Islamic Party of 
Malaysia (PAS) Parliament Member Dzulkifli Ahmad lamented that 
liberal activists could view the cases only from an individual rights 
perspective and not see that such a framework necessarily undermines 
 
90. See The Coalition Called Article 11: Myth and Facts, ALIRAN (Mar. 27, 
2007), http://aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2006/200611/the-coalition-called-article-
11-myths-and-facts/ (discussing how the Article 11 coalition has also sent an open 
letter to the Prime Minister, organized public forums, and provided interviews and 
press releases).  
91. Id.; Open Letter: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the Federal Constitution, 
PETITION ONLINE, http://www.petitiononline.com/constsup/petition.html (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
92. This specific point was made by several prominent Islamic NGO leaders in 
personal interviews. Interview with Zaid Kamaruddin, Head of Jamaah Islah 
Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 25, 2009); Interview with Yusri 
Mohammad, Head of ABIM, in Kuala Lumpur, Malay. (June 30, 2009). 
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the collective right of the Muslim community to govern its own 
affairs.93 For Dzulkifli and others, adverse rulings in any of the cases 
involving Article 121(1A) would be tantamount to “abolishing and 
dismantling the Shariah Court.”94 For conservatives, individual rights 
talk is marked by an expansionist and even an “imperialist” 
orientation. Just as discourse among liberal rights activists is marked 
by fear that individual rights faced an imminent threat, a deep anxiety 
set in among those who wished to protect what they viewed as the 
collective rights of the Muslim community.   
Of course an understanding of the religious community as the 
legitimate bearer of rights obfuscates the issue of how religious 
authority was constructed in Malaysia in the first place. As we have 
seen, the legal dilemmas concerning the authority and jurisdiction of 
the shariah courts were not the result of an inherent or essential tension 
between the Islamic legal tradition and individual rights. Rather, these 
legal dilemmas were the result of the state’s specific formalization and 
institutionalization of state law. The bifurcation of the legal system 
into parallel jurisdictions had hard-wired the legal system to produce 
legal tensions. 
Liberal rights groups were not the only organizations to mobilize 
in the name of freedom of religion. A group of lawyers calling 
themselves Lawyers in Defense of Islam (Peguam Pembela Islam) 
held a press conference to announce their formation at the Federal 
Territories Shariah Court Building on July 13, 2006. Their explicit aim 
was to “take action to defend the position of Islam” in direct response 
to the activities of the Article 11 coalition. A few days later, a broad 
array of conservative Muslim NGOs united in a coalition calling itself 
Muslim Organizations for the Defense of Islam (Pertubuhan-
Pertubuhan Pembela Islam), or Defenders (PEMBELA) for short. 
PEMBELA brought together over fifty Muslim organizations 
including ABIM, Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), the Shariah Lawyers’ 
Association of Malaysia (PGSM), and the Muslim Professionals 
Forum. The founding statement for Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela 
Islam explains that the immediate motivation for organizing were the 
 
93. This view was summed up in the title of Dzulkifli Ahmed’s book on the 
topic, Blind Spot. DZULKIFLI AHMAD, BLIND SPOT: THE ISLAMIC STATE DEBATE, 
NEP, AND OTHER ISSUES (2007).  
94. Id. at 153. 
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Article 121(1A) cases which, in their view, challenged “the position of 
Islam in the Constitution and the legal system of this country.”95  
Conservative NGOs organized dozens of public forums and 
flooded the Malay language press with hundreds more articles and 
opinion pieces on the need to defend the autonomy of the shariah 
courts from outside interference. Demonstrating their grassroots 
support, PEMBELA submitted a 700,000-signature petition to the 
Prime Minister, dwarfing the 20,000 signatures that Article 11 
coalition was able to muster.  
Civil society groups fundamentally shaped popular 
understandings of what was at stake for the future of Malaysia.96 
Rather than understanding these conundrums as the result of 
Malaysian positive law and the institutional structure of the Malaysian 
judiciary, the vast majority of Malaysians came to understand the cases 
as reflecting inherent and unavoidable tensions of liberal rights versus 
Islamic law, individual rights versus collective rights, and secularism 
versus religion.  
V. THE PARADOX AND POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
MALAYSIA 
The political spectacle accompanying these cases exacerbated the 
dilemmas that attorneys, judges, and everyday citizens encountered in 
their efforts to maneuver through the Malaysian legal system. In the 
past, attorneys had found pragmatic ways of helping Malaysians 
change their official legal status, in spite of lacunas in the law. 
Malaysians had been able to secure state recognition of conversion by 
affirming a statutory declaration before a commissioner of oaths and 
registering a new name in the civil court registry through a deed poll.97 
With these two documents, an individual could then secure a new 
identity card reflecting the name change, which signified one’s new, 
non-Muslim status.98 For most purposes, including marriage, one 
 
95. Press Release, PEMBELA, “Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam Desak 
Masalah Murtad Ditangani Secara Serius” [Defenders of Islam Urge More 
Seriousness in Handling the Apostasy Problem] (July 17, 2006) (on file with author). 
96. For a more detailed examination of these dynamics, see Moustafa, supra 
note 62.  For more on lay understandings of Islamic law in Malaysia, see Tamir 
Moustafa, Islamic Law, Women’s Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in 
Malaysia, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 168 (2013). 
97. A statutory declaration is the equivalent of an affidavit. A deed poll is a legal 
statement to express an intention. 
98. Salbiah Ahmad, Islam in Malaysia: Constitutional and Human Rights 
Perspectives, 2 MUSLIM WORLD J.  HUM. RTS. 10–11 (2005). 
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could then go on with life as one wished. The compartmentalization of 
different personal status laws for Muslims and non-Muslims and their 
entrenchment in parallel civil and shariah court jurisdictions still 
afforded workable solutions for individuals and couples attempting to 
negotiate their way between the two legal regimes.   
Early Article 121(1A) cases percolated up through the civil courts 
beginning soon after the 1988 constitutional amendment, but cases did 
not command popular attention until the Lina Joy and Shamala cases. 
Attorneys recount that, prior to Lina Joy and Shamala, shariah court 
judges had regularly facilitated the official recognition of conversion 
out of Islam when they were called upon.99 But once the cases became 
a focal point of public debate, intense pressures engulfed both the 
shariah and the civil courts. This politicized environment made it 
difficult even for sympathetic shariah court judges to facilitate state 
recognition of conversion out of Islam.100 Likewise, intense political 
pressure made it difficult for civil court judges to adopt different 
interpretations of Article 121(1A) that might enable the civil courts to 
intervene when fundamental liberties were in jeopardy. Instead, the 
civil courts ceded authority to the shariah courts in virtually all the 
subsequent cases that involved the fact patterns of Lina Joy and 
Shamala.  
Shamala and Lina Joy underline some of the paradoxes, 
ambiguities, and indeterminacies of “religious freedom” that fuel a 
politics of religious freedom. The first and most apparent paradox is 
that both sides emphatically demanded freedom from state interference 
in religious life, yet both sides were also reliant on state power to 
enforce diametrically opposed visions of religious freedom. This 
apparent contradiction underlines the fact that both the concept of 
religious freedom and the politics of religious freedom are 
fundamentally rooted in the legal and judicial mechanisms of the 
modern state. Absent the power and reach of the modern state, there 
would be no strident debate over how to order and regulate society. A 
closer look at the origins of the cases further reveals that the legal 
conundrums are rooted in complex, interlocking dilemmas that involve 
the juridification of race and religion and competing state and federal 
 
99. Interviews with Latheefa Koya and Fadiah Nadwa Fikri, Attorneys, in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malay. (June 29, 2009). 
100. This was true even for Chinese and Indian Malaysians who had converted 
to Islam for marriage, but wished to change their legal status back to their original 
faith after the death of a spouse or the failure of a marriage. 
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jurisdictions, both of which were part of the state building process and 
both of which are direct legacies of the British colonial project. The 
fact that these dilemmas are interlocking, and each backed by 
entrenched political and economic interests, suggests that these 
quandaries are not going away anytime soon.  
Ironically, the tools and institutions that we instinctively turn to 
for justice—law and courts—are, in fact, principal sources of tension 
in the politics of religious liberty in Malaysia. Instead of resolving 
legal questions, the court system is hard-wired to produce legal 
controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrate between contending 
parties, the courts exacerbate ideological cleavages.101 And instead of 
assuaging uncertainties, courts in Malaysia repeatedly instill a 
tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anxiety around 
the meaning and content of “religious freedom.”  
 
101. As discussed, many of the civil society groups that had mobilized around 
Lina Joy formed as a direct result of the cases themselves. These include the Article 
11 Coalition, PEMBELA, and several of their constituent organizations.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 90, 95. 
